The article argues that despite the evident link between political environment and security of energy supply, political elements are not sufficiently represented in contemporary scientific literature, namely in indexes that are designed for the assessment of security of energy supply. In an attempt to fill this gap, the article presents an innovative methodology for quantitative assessment of the political vulnerabilities on security of energy supply and applies it to the analysis of the Baltic States.
INTRODUCTION
The security of the energy supply is influenced by a wide range of political aspects. Political decisions can disrupt the flow of energy supplies, cause fluctuations in energy prices, and determine the functionality of energy infrastructure. Most of the former Soviet republics have experienced this linkage between political aspects and security of energy supply in one way or another 1 . For example, in Lithuania, independence aspirations in early 90's were countered with energy blockades by the Soviet Union. A couple of years later, steep price and natural gas supply cuts affected the parliamentary election in Lithuania. Moreover, Lithuania's rigid position not to sell its strategic crude oil refinery "Mažeikių nafta"
to companies associated with Russian state was met with periodical oil supply disruptions that were finalized by the closure of "Druzhba 2" oil pipeline in 2006. 2 Lithuania's persistence in implementing the Third energy package was met by the unilateral decision of Russian state-owned company "Gazprom" to increase the prices of natural gas compared to countries in the region 3 . Finally, if the statements in the most recent report of Lithuanian State Security Department are to be trusted, then it is evident that Russia will continue to use energy as a tool to achieve political goals in the Baltic States and the European Union. There are many indexes that fail to assess domestic political environment or face other shortcomings in terms of reflection of political elements. Energy security assessment indexes, suggested by IEA, 25 and M Scheepers 26 ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 9, NUMBER 1 2016
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absolutely reliable and that the imports decrease reliability fails to assess the full complexity of domestic political elements of a country being measured.
Some indexes fail to capture the full spectrum of primary energy sources, namely the indexes suggested by E. Gupta; 28 C. Coq and E. Paltseva; 29 and M.
Frondel and Christoph M. Schmidt. 30 The former focuses only on the external supply of oil, while the latter ones put emphasis on fossil fuels. The index of U.S. 32 In index it is argued that the 1980s were the worst for the U.S. energy security, however, this index only allows to compare the change of the level of energy security, by showing how much it has improved or worsened compared to 1980s. 33 Chloe Le Coq and Elena Paltseva, supra note 29: 4478. 34 The Baltic States provides a good example in explaining how the results are skewed. Latvia and Estonia import 1/3 to 2/3 of petroleum products needed from Lithuania, which has an oil refinery. The disruptions to the oil supply to Lithuania directly affect Latvia and Estonia, at least in the short-term, as they would need to search for diversification of supply of petroleum products. Considering Lithuania as the source of petroleum products when assessing security of oil supply to Latvia and Estonia would not reflect the real situation. This is because Lithuania would be assessed as a more reliable supplier than Belarus or Russia, not taking into account that oil is imported from Russia. 35 The Baltic States are chosen for testing the methodology due to two main reasons. First of all, they are net energy importers. Second of all, it is not common to assess the impact of political elements on security of energy supply to the Baltic States by using quantitative methodology. The studies are dominated by descriptive research. 39 Despite the fact that political scientists have failed to agree on a common energy security definition, it can be argued that failure to ensure the physical availability of energy to its end consumers makes problems, which are related with other energy security aspects, far less relevant. 40 Therefore, the most important dimension or the basic fundamental starting point of energy security is the physical availability of energy resources.
The availability of energy resources in countries which cannot meet their energy needs by indigenous production, has to be ensured by importing energy from producer countries. 41 ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 9, NUMBER 1 2016
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production and supply of only primary energy) show not the level of security, but the plausibility of the occurrence of threats to security on energy supply.
Therefore, the methodology should allow for assessing the vulnerability of energy supply (which is dependent on political aspects) by indicating the likelihood of disruption of supply of primary energy due to political elements. The methodology does not aim to set thresholds for political security of supplies, but to assess tendencies and probabilities. Probability type indexes usually avoid setting thresholds; in fact, most of the indexes that have been analysed in the introductory chapter avoid setting thresholds.
MEASURING POLITICAL VULNERABILITY
In order to measure the political vulnerabilities of the security of energy supply, an appropriate data base has been chosen. The criteria for selecting the data base are based on four general requirements. First, the data has to be publically available. Some researchers use databases that are either publically not available or too expensive for many of their peers, thus lowering the possibilities to repeat the research. Second, the data base has to include as many countries as possible. A number of reputable databases are limited in geographic scope; they are created for particular regions and lack global coverage. Third, the data set has to present aggregated data. Forth, the data has to be renewed annually, allowing to track tendencies in long periods of time.
The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project corresponds to the aforementioned criteria; therefore, its data can be used for creation of indicators.
48
WGI aggregated and individual governance dimensions cover 215 economies over the period of 1996-2014 for all dimensions of governance: voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. WGI is publically accessible and renewed annually.
The WGI project provides a specific concept of governance that is applied in the methodology, arguing that governance is "the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. importance of political elements for assessing vulnerability of energy security, there is a need to find and include the best accessible socio-political data that is wide in its geographic scope. This leads to the challenge of data accessibility and scope.
For the previously mentioned reasons, the WGI aggregated and individual governance indicators are the best choice for similar indexes as the indicators cover 215 economies over the period of 1996-2014, for all dimensions of governance:
voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. Despite the aforementioned challenges, the importance of political elements, as has been outlined in this chapter, indicates the need to include them in an assessment of the political vulnerabilities on security of energy supply.
THE ASSESSMENT OF POLITICAL VULNERABILITY ON SECURITY OF ENERGY SUPPLY
The political vulnerability assessment on security of energy supply presents a single unified index, which is based on the values of two groups of indicators. First group represents quantities (import and domestic production) of primary energy Indicators are converted into unified percentile metrics where 0% is the minimal meaning -indicating the worst case, and 100% is the maximum meaning, indicating the best case.
The index of political vulnerability on security of energy supply is calculated as follows:
PVSSk -political vulnerability to security of energy supply in country k; Dkj -share of particular primary resource in total production and import of primary energy resources in country k; m -number of resources.
Eji -share of country I in the total primary energy production and import quantity of resource j in country k; n -number of countries;
PSAWi -Political Stability and Absence of Violence value of country i;
GEi -Government Effectiveness value of country i;
RQi -Regulatory Quality value of country i;
RLi -Rule of Law value of country i; w1-4 -weight assigned to relevant elements of political nature (for the calculations in this research equal weights of 25% were assigned) 67 .
The equation proceeds in two main steps. In the first one, outlined in major brackets, the political vulnerability on security of energy supply in particular energy resource sector (natural gas, crude oil, solid fuels, renewable or nuclear energy) is calculated. The shares of different countries in the total gross inland consumption of particular energy resource (Eji) are multiplied by a sum of values of relevant elements of a political nature (PSAWi; GEi; RQi; RLi) of countries of origin i that are weighted against set weights (w1-4). 64 Secondary energy sources were excluded from the index due to occurring overlap in the calculations: it is not possible to link the secondary energy with the origin of resources, from which the energy was produced. 65 If one would like to use this index for analyzing the countries outside the European Union, other statistical databases, such as the one of International Energy Agency or U.S. Energy Information Administration, can be used as well. 66 The calculation was grounded on the methodological advice of experts affiliated with Lithuanian Energy Institute and guidelines and guidelines of International Energy Agency. 67 Such values were set after extensive discussions with experts of Energy Security Research Centre.
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The second part of the equation, which is outlined before the major brackets, accounts for general political vulnerability on security of energy supply in country k subtracting from 100. Corresponding to the statements above, this value will illuminate how politically vulnerable energy consumer is in regard of all primary energy resource supply. The higher the value, the more vulnerable the country is.
In order to make the formula easier to comprehend, a hypothetical example is introduced that operates with fictional data. Country X uses three primary energy sources: crude oil, natural gas, and nuclear energy. Crude oil accounts for 50% of gross inland primary energy consumption, while the remaining two sources accounts for 25% each. Crude oil is supplied by two countries, referred to as A (25%) and B (75%). All of the natural gas is supplied by country C, while the nuclear energy is produced domestically. The political indicators show that Country X has a value of 60%, A has a value of 50%, while B and C have 40% each. This data allows for two conclusions. The first one refers to political vulnerability on security of energy supply in a particular energy sector, while the second one refers to political vulnerability on energy supply security in all energy sectors.
Hence, security of oil supply of country X is 42.5%, 40% in the natural gas sector, and 60% in the nuclear energy sector. 68 Further calculations allow for assessment of the political vulnerability on security of energy supply in a given year for country X. Since the majority of gross inland primary energy consumption is covered by crude oil, it has biggest weight in calculation of the final value, while natural gas and nuclear energy have lower weights. Therefore, the political vulnerability on security of energy supply of this hypothetical country X is 53.75%
(46.25% before the subtraction from 100).
The index consists of a number of sub-indexes with each of them representing political vulnerability on security of energy supply for particular energy source. Thus sub-indexes can be used separately or combined with other indicators in different indexes. The political vulnerability on security of any resource (oil, natural gas, etc.) supply can be calculated for any country consumer.
In sum, this methodology provides greater importance to energy resources that dominate the energy sector of a particular country at a given time. It also 68 In order to illustrate the level of political vulnerability in specific energy sector and use it as subindex, the aforementioned values has to be subtracted from 100 manually and it is not included in the equation.
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emphasizes the importance of the most important suppliers, as the largest importers may cause more problems for energy supply or make it more stable. Political vulnerability on security of energy supply was higher in Latvia (45.23% on average), while vulnerability was the highest in Lithuania (52.32% on average; see 
POLITICAL VULNERABILITIES ON SECURITY OF ENERGY SUPPLY
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The results of the index can be explained by exploring the overall gross inland energy consumption patterns and the balance between the usage of domestic and imported energy resources to cover national demand. In relation to the pattern of gross inland consumption, it should be underlined that Lithuania consumes twice as much primary energy then Latvia and Estonia combined (see Figure 2 below ). The vulnerabilities of the security of Lithuania's energy supply depends more on the political environment of its energy trade partners, while, in contrast, Latvia and Estonia's mostly depends on countries' own political aspects, which can be affected more by domestic political decisions. Since the absolute majority of Lithuania's primary energy imports came from Russia (on average 92.09%), its vulnerability was mostly dependent from Russian political aspects, where political vulnerability reaches 57.81% on average. Consequentially, a rather fair political environment in Lithuania, as vulnerability reaches 34.67% on average, does not bring a substantial weight to calculations due to the majority of its gross inland energy consumption being covered by import (77.08%) mainly from Russia.
Despite the fact that the absolute majority of Latvia and Estonia's primary energy imports also come from Russia, the balance between domestic production and imports decreases Russia's importance as regards the political vulnerability on energy supply, and the domestic political environment has a greater impact. For these reasons Estonia and Latvia enjoy a lower vulnerability rate in comparison to Lithuania.
Russia, on the other hand, is only insignificantly dependent on Lithuania's energy market. In 2011 Lithuania's share in Gazprom's natural gas export was only 1.34% of all natural gas exports; the shares of Latvia and Estonia were even smaller, respectively 0.5% and 0.29%. 72 Lithuania imported only 3.66% of Russia's Estonia, domestic energy production in Lithuania decreased, which naturally led to an increase in imports. Therefore, the impact of political aspects of Russia became more important to the political vulnerability on security of supply for Lithuania, thus increasing vulnerability.
In sum, the methodology has exposed the political vulnerabilities of security of energy supply, and fluctuations in vulnerabilities of the Baltic States in the analysed time frame. Furthermore, the proposed method has managed to highlight the causes for fluctuations in the levels of political vulnerability of security of energy supply in the Baltic States.
THE IMPACT OF NATURAL GAS SUPPLY DIVERSIFICATION ON THE POLITICAL VULNERABILITIES OF SECURITY OF ENERGY SUPPLY IN
LITHUANIA
The year 2015 was marked by fundamental changes in Lithuanian energy system due to the start of commercial activity of Liquefied Natural Gas Terminal.
The fundamental purpose of the project was to enhance energy security of 75 Source: authors' calculations (data from The Eurostat).
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Lithuania by diversifying natural gas imports; therefore, it is relevant to analyse what kind of impact it might have on political vulnerability of the security of energy supply in the country. Even though the proposed index is not able to evaluate the factual impact, 76 it can project it by constructing a scenario.
The goal of the proposed scenario is to measure how political vulnerability on security of energy supply for Lithuania can change, if Lithuania will import 50% of natural gas from Norway, assuming that a liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal had already been in operation since 2004. It is worth underscoring that the focus in the scenario is only on political vulnerability and no price aspects are included. If Lithuania imported 50% of its natural gas needs from Norway and the remaining 50% from Russia, political vulnerability on security of supply to Lithuania would decrease by 3.54 percentage points on average ( Figure 6 ). Imports from politically more stable and reliable countries decrease vulnerability. This shows that the diversification of energy supply to Lithuania from politically more stable and reliable countries is needed in oil and solid fuel sectors.
CONCLUDING REMARKS: ADVANTAGES AND LIMITS OF THE INDEX
The article has argued that political aspects are not sufficiently represented in existing quantitative assessments of security of energy supply. The aforementioned indexes either ignored them or the assessed importance was not sufficient to reflect the political impact. Therefore, the article came up with an index of its own with the emphasis on political aspects, which influences the vulnerability on security of energy supply to a great extent. Furthermore, the proposed index was applied to assess the political vulnerability on security of energy supply in the Baltic States. context it has to be mentioned that the 'N-1' principle is not included in the index, as it is usually applied in electricity generation sector, and application of such principle to other energy sectors would not represent the practices of primary energy imports. The only sector for which the 'N-1' principle could be applied is natural gas transportation; however, particularities come into effect, like technological limitations as different pipelines have different directions, and at the same time states cannot be certain that during supply disruption they will have possibilities to buy and import gas from gas storage facilities, as this depends on the policies of the owners of storage facilities. All other primary energy resources can be transported in different manner, ranging from pipelines to road and rail transportation. The index focuses only on the actual levels of imports and domestic consumption of resources, while not taking production and transportation infrastructure into account.
States are able to change domestic political elements more easily in order to decrease political vulnerabilities. However, this aspect is not included in the index for number of reasons. First, capabilities to impact political dynamics are very particularistic for each state, as each state has different state power of controlling political processes that depend on political context. Despite that, authors assume that this, at least in some part, is reflected by the element of government effectiveness. Second, each state has different capabilities to change or expand domestic production of particular resource, and this depends on resources and infrastructure the state has. The need of gathering vast amount of sensitive information that is usually not disclosed would limit the applicability of index methodology.
The methodology does not include the aspect of dependency between suppliers and consumers. It would seem logical that the higher the asymmetric dependency of consumers on suppliers the more vulnerable consumers have to be.
However, Russia-Ukraine energy conflicts show that, despite Ukraine remaining one of the biggest Russian natural gas consumers and a strategically important partner for natural gas export to Europe, this had not decreased political vulnerability on security of energy supply for Ukraine 78 . At the same time, the problem remains of how weights should be assigned for small and big consumers alike.
Finally, it has to be highlighted that socio-political data is usually considered "secondary type data", so different researchers argue how objectively political elements in methodology represent political vulnerabilities on security of energy supply. The article confirms that chosen political elements indeed have impact on security of energy supply. This index remains one of the steps in the creation of a universally applicable quantitative assessment of political vulnerabilities on security of energy supply. 78 In 2014, Russia was not supplying natural gas to Ukraine for a period of five months due to the military intervention. Shorter supply cut offs in natural gas were observed in 2006 and 2009.
